test(e2e): Phase 23B — rebuild E2E infrastructure; fix 6 real prod defects it exposed

Phase 23 closed as PARTIAL: fake coverage was gone, but the E2E layer itself
was still empty — no conftest.py anywhere, ~15 fixtures that never existed,
6 files crashing at import on os.environ["E2E_PASSWORD"], and CI never ran E2E.
STATUS's "10 E2E files / ~80+ cases ✅" described files that had never executed.

Infrastructure delivered:
- tests/e2e/conftest.py: ApiClient (trust_env=False — a host http_proxy turns
  localhost calls into 502), operator_token(username) / new_user / admin_token
  fixtures, and a session probe that calls pytest.exit(4) when the stack is
  unreachable. NOT skip: skip would launder "did not run" into "passed".
- pytest.ini, tests/e2e/requirements.txt, and tests/e2e/sql/
  seed_e2e_operators.sql — migrations contain NO operator seed at all, so a
  fresh database has zero logins; the seed creates 6 e2e accounts with role
  bindings, idempotent, password injected via `psql -v pwd`.
- CI job `e2e`: compose up -> poll /health/live (timeout = fail) -> seed ->
  pytest -> always teardown. Gate D-23-D is now closed.
- 8 E2E files migrated off import-time env reads; tautological assertions
  (`x == t or not x`), a counselor token standing in for content_editor, and a
  bare `status_code == 200` claiming to prove INV-020 were replaced with real
  permission/behavior assertions.

Six real production defects found only by running against real PostgreSQL
(H2 has zero coverage for all of them):
- D-23B-A (Critical): stale V042__add_appointment_operator_register_permission.sql
  left in target/classes; src had replaced it with V042__add_service_location_
  announcements.sql. Packing without clean put two V042 in the jar -> Flyway
  "Found more than one migration with version 042" -> app would not start.
  Guard added: testBuildOutputHasNoDuplicateMigrationVersions scans build output
  (src is clean, so only this catches it).
- D-23B-B (High): non-UUID path variable reached the DB -> 500 + leaked
  `invalid input syntax for type uuid`. Now rejected at the controller.
- D-23B-C (High): 6 E2E files raised KeyError at import -> never collected.
- D-23B-E (Critical): permissions = 48, role_permissions for super_admin = 18,
  matchmaker = 0. V015's "grant all to super_admin" was a point-in-time snapshot;
  the 30 permissions added later were never granted. On a fresh stack an admin
  cannot create a service station and matchmakers can do nothing. V044 restores
  super_admin to its documented definition (not an expansion); the matchmaker
  permission set needs a product decision and is left as a residual.
- D-23B-I (Medium): IllegalArgumentException (e.g. invalid activity type) was
  unmapped -> 500. Now BAD_REQUEST.
- D-23B-J (High): `operator does not exist: uuid = character varying` — Java
  ids are String, columns are uuid, PostgreSQL does not implicitly cast in
  comparisons. Fixed at the source with JDBC `stringtype=unspecified` (docker
  profile); production datasource comes from deploy env and needs the same.

One judgement retracted: an initial read suggested service_appointment.register
was missing. It is not — the endpoint uses service.assisted_registration, seeded
in V029, and the code deliberately avoids a duplicate permission. Nothing was
changed on that basis.

Verification: 33 E2E passed against a live stack; unreachable stack and a
missing operator password both exit 4 (never skip/pass); backend regression
656 / 0 failures / 0 errors / 3 skipped (baseline 655, +1 guard, negatively
validated by injecting a duplicate V042 -> exactly one test turned red).

tests/e2e/organization_isolation_test.py

@@ -1,32 +1,31 @@
 """
-E2E 测试：Phase 23 - 组织关系隔离
+组织关系隔离 E2E（INV-018 / INV-020）。
+
+迁移说明：原文件两个用例只断言 `status_code == 200`，却宣称验证了
+"组织关系不自动授予用户数据访问权限" —— 这与 INV-020 毫无逻辑关联，
+属典型假覆盖。现改为真实的越权访问断言。
 """
-import os
 import pytest
-import requests
 
-BASE_URL = "http://localhost:8085/api/v1"
-E2E_PASSWORD = os.environ["E2E_PASSWORD"]
+pytestmark = pytest.mark.e2e
 
-def get_admin_token():
-    r = requests.post(f"{BASE_URL}/auth/operator/login", json={"username": "admin", "password": E2E_PASSWORD})
-    return r.json()["data"]["accessToken"]
 
-def auth_header(token):
-    return {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"}
+def test_station_operator_cannot_browse_all_users(api, operator_token):
+    """
+    INV-018：服务站运营人员只能处理现场预约与指定任务，
+    不得浏览全平台用户库（INV-020：组织关系不自动授予数据权限）。
+    """
+    token = operator_token("e2e_station")
+    resp = api.call("GET", "/operator/users", token=token)
+    assert resp.status_code == 403, (
+        f"服务站运营竟能浏览全用户库：HTTP {resp.status_code} {resp.text[:200]}"
+    )
 
-def test_activity_organizations_are_isolated():
-    # 组织A的管理员不应看到组织B的活动详情
-    token = get_admin_token()
-    r = requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}/activities", headers=auth_header(token))
-    assert r.status_code == 200
-    # 验证活动列表返回正常
 
-def test_no_auto_permission_from_org_relationship():
-    # 验证组织关系不自动授予用户数据访问权限（INV-020）
-    # 此测试验证数据库中不存在基于组织关系的自动权限授予
-    r = requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}/operator/analytics/v11/service-programs", headers=auth_header(get_admin_token()))
-    assert r.status_code == 200
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    pytest.main([__file__, "-v"])
+def test_counselor_cannot_browse_all_users(api, operator_token):
+    """INV-012/020：咨询师同理，组织/角色关系不等于全量数据权限。"""
+    token = operator_token("e2e_counselor")
+    resp = api.call("GET", "/operator/users", token=token)
+    assert resp.status_code == 403, (
+        f"咨询师竟能浏览全用户库：HTTP {resp.status_code} {resp.text[:200]}"
+    )