WorkBuddy
730dddde30
Phase 23 closed as PARTIAL: fake coverage was gone, but the E2E layer itself
was still empty — no conftest.py anywhere, ~15 fixtures that never existed,
6 files crashing at import on os.environ["E2E_PASSWORD"], and CI never ran E2E.
STATUS's "10 E2E files / ~80+ cases ✅" described files that had never executed.
Infrastructure delivered:
- tests/e2e/conftest.py: ApiClient (trust_env=False — a host http_proxy turns
localhost calls into 502), operator_token(username) / new_user / admin_token
fixtures, and a session probe that calls pytest.exit(4) when the stack is
unreachable. NOT skip: skip would launder "did not run" into "passed".
- pytest.ini, tests/e2e/requirements.txt, and tests/e2e/sql/
seed_e2e_operators.sql — migrations contain NO operator seed at all, so a
fresh database has zero logins; the seed creates 6 e2e accounts with role
bindings, idempotent, password injected via `psql -v pwd`.
- CI job `e2e`: compose up -> poll /health/live (timeout = fail) -> seed ->
pytest -> always teardown. Gate D-23-D is now closed.
- 8 E2E files migrated off import-time env reads; tautological assertions
(`x == t or not x`), a counselor token standing in for content_editor, and a
bare `status_code == 200` claiming to prove INV-020 were replaced with real
permission/behavior assertions.
Six real production defects found only by running against real PostgreSQL
(H2 has zero coverage for all of them):
- D-23B-A (Critical): stale V042__add_appointment_operator_register_permission.sql
left in target/classes; src had replaced it with V042__add_service_location_
announcements.sql. Packing without clean put two V042 in the jar -> Flyway
"Found more than one migration with version 042" -> app would not start.
Guard added: testBuildOutputHasNoDuplicateMigrationVersions scans build output
(src is clean, so only this catches it).
- D-23B-B (High): non-UUID path variable reached the DB -> 500 + leaked
`invalid input syntax for type uuid`. Now rejected at the controller.
- D-23B-C (High): 6 E2E files raised KeyError at import -> never collected.
- D-23B-E (Critical): permissions = 48, role_permissions for super_admin = 18,
matchmaker = 0. V015's "grant all to super_admin" was a point-in-time snapshot;
the 30 permissions added later were never granted. On a fresh stack an admin
cannot create a service station and matchmakers can do nothing. V044 restores
super_admin to its documented definition (not an expansion); the matchmaker
permission set needs a product decision and is left as a residual.
- D-23B-I (Medium): IllegalArgumentException (e.g. invalid activity type) was
unmapped -> 500. Now BAD_REQUEST.
- D-23B-J (High): `operator does not exist: uuid = character varying` — Java
ids are String, columns are uuid, PostgreSQL does not implicitly cast in
comparisons. Fixed at the source with JDBC `stringtype=unspecified` (docker
profile); production datasource comes from deploy env and needs the same.
One judgement retracted: an initial read suggested service_appointment.register
was missing. It is not — the endpoint uses service.assisted_registration, seeded
in V029, and the code deliberately avoids a duplicate permission. Nothing was
changed on that basis.
Verification: 33 E2E passed against a live stack; unreachable stack and a
missing operator password both exit 4 (never skip/pass); backend regression
656 / 0 failures / 0 errors / 3 skipped (baseline 655, +1 guard, negatively
validated by injecting a duplicate V042 -> exactly one test turned red).
76 lines
2.9 KiB
Python
76 lines
2.9 KiB
Python
"""
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婚恋咨询权限 E2E（INV-012 只能访问分配的咨询 / INV-013 红娘不能读咨询正文）。
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关键设计：**先证明本人能读到正文**，再证明他人读不到。
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只断言"他人读不到"会被"全局脱敏/接口全量报错"轻易蒙混过关——
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那证明的不是 INV-013，而是接口坏了。
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"""
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import pytest
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pytestmark = pytest.mark.e2e
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SENSITIVE = "SENSITIVE-BODY-MARKER"
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def _create_counseling(api, token: str) -> str:
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data = api.ok(
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"POST",
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"/counseling/services",
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token=token,
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json={
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"serviceType": "relationship_guidance",
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"requestSource": "user_self",
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"userRequestSummary": SENSITIVE,
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"preferredServiceMode": "online",
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"preferredTime": "morning",
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},
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)
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assert data["status"] == "pending", f"咨询初始状态异常：{data}"
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return data["id"]
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def test_owner_can_read_own_request_summary(api, user_token):
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"""反证：接口确实会返回正文，"读不到"才可能是权限生效而非接口失效。"""
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service_id = _create_counseling(api, user_token)
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data = api.ok("GET", f"/counseling/services/{service_id}", token=user_token)
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assert data["userRequestSummary"] == SENSITIVE, f"本人竟读不到自己的咨询正文：{data}"
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def test_matchmaker_has_no_counseling_view(api, user_token, operator_token):
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"""INV-013：红娘不具备 counseling.service.view，读取咨询详情必须被拒。"""
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service_id = _create_counseling(api, user_token)
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resp = api.call(
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"GET",
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f"/counseling/services/operator/{service_id}",
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token=operator_token("e2e_matchmaker"),
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 403, (
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f"红娘竟被允许访问咨询详情：HTTP {resp.status_code} {resp.text[:200]}"
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)
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assert SENSITIVE not in resp.text, "响应体泄漏了咨询正文"
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def test_counselor_cannot_read_unassigned_service(api, user_token, operator_token):
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"""INV-012：咨询师只能访问明确分配给自己的服务。"""
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service_id = _create_counseling(api, user_token)
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resp = api.call(
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"GET",
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f"/counseling/services/operator/{service_id}",
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token=operator_token("e2e_counselor"),
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)
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body = resp.json()
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assert body.get("success") is False, f"未分配的咨询竟被咨询师读到：{body}"
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assert SENSITIVE not in resp.text, "响应体泄漏了咨询正文"
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def test_non_uuid_service_id_is_rejected_not_500(api, user_token):
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"""
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非 UUID 的 path 参数应被判为 400，而不是打到数据库抛出
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`operator does not exist: uuid = character varying` 变成 500。
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"""
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resp = api.call("GET", "/counseling/services/not-a-uuid", token=user_token)
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assert resp.status_code != 500, (
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f"非法 ID 触发了 500（数据库类型异常外泄）：HTTP {resp.status_code}"
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)
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assert 400 <= resp.status_code < 500, f"非法 ID 应返回 4xx，实际 {resp.status_code}"
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