WorkBuddy
730dddde30
Phase 23 closed as PARTIAL: fake coverage was gone, but the E2E layer itself
was still empty — no conftest.py anywhere, ~15 fixtures that never existed,
6 files crashing at import on os.environ["E2E_PASSWORD"], and CI never ran E2E.
STATUS's "10 E2E files / ~80+ cases ✅" described files that had never executed.
Infrastructure delivered:
- tests/e2e/conftest.py: ApiClient (trust_env=False — a host http_proxy turns
localhost calls into 502), operator_token(username) / new_user / admin_token
fixtures, and a session probe that calls pytest.exit(4) when the stack is
unreachable. NOT skip: skip would launder "did not run" into "passed".
- pytest.ini, tests/e2e/requirements.txt, and tests/e2e/sql/
seed_e2e_operators.sql — migrations contain NO operator seed at all, so a
fresh database has zero logins; the seed creates 6 e2e accounts with role
bindings, idempotent, password injected via `psql -v pwd`.
- CI job `e2e`: compose up -> poll /health/live (timeout = fail) -> seed ->
pytest -> always teardown. Gate D-23-D is now closed.
- 8 E2E files migrated off import-time env reads; tautological assertions
(`x == t or not x`), a counselor token standing in for content_editor, and a
bare `status_code == 200` claiming to prove INV-020 were replaced with real
permission/behavior assertions.
Six real production defects found only by running against real PostgreSQL
(H2 has zero coverage for all of them):
- D-23B-A (Critical): stale V042__add_appointment_operator_register_permission.sql
left in target/classes; src had replaced it with V042__add_service_location_
announcements.sql. Packing without clean put two V042 in the jar -> Flyway
"Found more than one migration with version 042" -> app would not start.
Guard added: testBuildOutputHasNoDuplicateMigrationVersions scans build output
(src is clean, so only this catches it).
- D-23B-B (High): non-UUID path variable reached the DB -> 500 + leaked
`invalid input syntax for type uuid`. Now rejected at the controller.
- D-23B-C (High): 6 E2E files raised KeyError at import -> never collected.
- D-23B-E (Critical): permissions = 48, role_permissions for super_admin = 18,
matchmaker = 0. V015's "grant all to super_admin" was a point-in-time snapshot;
the 30 permissions added later were never granted. On a fresh stack an admin
cannot create a service station and matchmakers can do nothing. V044 restores
super_admin to its documented definition (not an expansion); the matchmaker
permission set needs a product decision and is left as a residual.
- D-23B-I (Medium): IllegalArgumentException (e.g. invalid activity type) was
unmapped -> 500. Now BAD_REQUEST.
- D-23B-J (High): `operator does not exist: uuid = character varying` — Java
ids are String, columns are uuid, PostgreSQL does not implicitly cast in
comparisons. Fixed at the source with JDBC `stringtype=unspecified` (docker
profile); production datasource comes from deploy env and needs the same.
One judgement retracted: an initial read suggested service_appointment.register
was missing. It is not — the endpoint uses service.assisted_registration, seeded
in V029, and the code deliberately avoids a duplicate permission. Nothing was
changed on that basis.
Verification: 33 E2E passed against a live stack; unreachable stack and a
missing operator password both exit 4 (never skip/pass); backend regression
656 / 0 failures / 0 errors / 3 skipped (baseline 655, +1 guard, negatively
validated by injecting a duplicate V042 -> exactly one test turned red).
55 lines
2.1 KiB
Python
55 lines
2.1 KiB
Python
"""
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本地资格 E2E（INV-011：本地资格佐证不得被未授权方读取）。
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打真实活栈：新用户经 mock 微信登录，走真实的声明/查询链路。
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"""
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import pytest
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pytestmark = pytest.mark.e2e
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# 生产 local_eligibility 的 eligibility_type CHECK 白名单内的合规取值。
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ELIGIBILITY_TYPE = "household_registration"
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REGION_CODE = "321181" # 丹阳
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def test_new_user_is_not_declared(api, user_token):
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data = api.ok("GET", "/local-eligibility", token=user_token)
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assert data["verificationStatus"] == "not_declared", f"新用户初始状态异常：{data}"
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def test_declaration_is_persisted(api, user_token):
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"""声明后应能查回声明内容（真实落库，不是内存态）。"""
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api.ok(
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"POST",
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"/local-eligibility/declaration",
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token=user_token,
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json={"eligibilityType": ELIGIBILITY_TYPE, "regionCode": REGION_CODE},
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)
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data = api.ok("GET", "/local-eligibility", token=user_token)
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assert data["eligibilityType"] == ELIGIBILITY_TYPE, f"声明未落库：{data}"
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assert data["verificationStatus"] != "not_declared", f"声明后状态未推进：{data}"
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def test_other_user_cannot_read_my_declaration(api, new_user):
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"""
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INV-011（数据侧）：资格查询是 userId 自限定的，
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另一个用户读到的必须是**他自己的**空状态，绝不能看到 A 的声明。
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"""
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user_a = new_user()
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api.ok(
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"POST",
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"/local-eligibility/declaration",
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token=user_a["token"],
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json={"eligibilityType": ELIGIBILITY_TYPE, "regionCode": REGION_CODE},
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)
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mine = api.ok("GET", "/local-eligibility", token=user_a["token"])
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assert mine["eligibilityType"] == ELIGIBILITY_TYPE
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user_b = new_user()
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other = api.ok("GET", "/local-eligibility", token=user_b["token"])
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assert other["userId"] == user_b["user_id"], "返回了他人 userId（越权）"
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assert other["userId"] != user_a["user_id"]
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assert other["eligibilityType"] is None, f"B 看到了 A 的资格声明（越权）：{other}"
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assert other["verificationStatus"] == "not_declared"
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